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Introduction
John W  de Gruchy
The essays published in this volume were amongst the more than sixty papers 
presented at the founding congress of the South African Academy of Religion 
(SAAR) held in Pretoria from 17-19 January 1994. The theme of the congress 
was Religion and Civil Society, a subject of considerable concern in the modern 
world, and of particular interest to those of us who were witnessing the birth of 
a new South Africa. Three months later Mr Nelson Mandela was inaugurated 
as President of South Africa not far from the University of South Africa where 
the congress had been held. Nothing demonstrated more the multi-cultural and 
multi-faith character of South Africa, the important role assigned to religion 
within our civil society, and the expectation that the various religious traditions 
had an important role to fulfil in the reconstruction of the country.
Many observers have noted that South Africa is a ‘very religious country5. That 
may, or may not be a compliment, but it is a reasonably accurate description. 
The fact that there are Departments of Religious Studies, as well as Faculties or 
Departments of Christian Theology, in virtually all our universities, and that 
religion is part of the curriculum within our school systems, is indicative of its 
pervasive character and influence. It is possible that this might change during the 
next few decades as South Africa rejoins the world, and as the acids of 
modernity bite more deeply into our society. But there is nothing inevitable 
about secularisation. On the contrary, the indications are that South Africa will 
continue to be profoundly influenced by the various religious traditions which are 
present within it, though undoubtedly in new and different ways to those with 
which we have become familiar in the past.
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Religion is an ambiguous phenomenon. Depending on one’s perspective, some 
of it is bad and some of it good. We know that only too well from our own 
South African experience where certain forms of Christianity gave legitimacy to 
apartheid, and others were in the forefront of the struggle to end its rule. Part 
of the task of the study of religion is not only to explore its character and seek 
to understand the ways in which it manifests itself, but also to exercise critical 
judgement on its truth claims as well as on the ways in which it impinges upon 
society. This is of fundamental importance in the struggle to ensure that a society 
such as ours is able to nurture moral values essential to our future. The scientific 
study of religion is of fundamental importance in this regard. A central aim of 
the South African Academy of Religion is to enable this task to be undertaken 
in a much more coherent and integrated way by providing a forum in and 
through which scholars from different disciplines, different faith communities (or 
none), different academic contexts, and different cultures, can co-operate in a 
new way.
It would be wrong to suggest that none of this has taken place prior to the 
formation of SAAR. The Association for the Study of Religion has long existed 
for this very purpose, and there are almost a dozen other academic societies in 
South Africa which have been engaged in the study of the Christian religion in 
relation to the traditional disciplines of theological study. But biblical scholars, 
theologians, and church historians have seldom had an opportunity to come 
together in the way in which the Academy now makes possible, and to do so in 
company with scholars from other faith communities as well as in dialogue with 
social scientists outside of the religious studies orbit who are also engaged in the 
study of religion within their disciplines. In brief, what the establishment of 
SAAR recognises is the need for both an interdisciplinary approach to the study 
of religion, and one which takes into full account the religious pluralism which 
increasingly characterises our society.
There can be no gainsaying that however much African religion is pervasive in 
our society, the dominant religious tradition since the advent of colonialism has 
been Christianity. Today the vast majority of the population claim some link with 
one or other of the Christian churches. The problem is that whenever one reli­
gious tradition becomes dominant it tends to domineer, often riding rough-shod 
over other religious traditions, and seeking to control the shaping of society. This 
is a problem for all who believe that while Christianity - like any other religion 
- should participate fully in the shaping of civil society, it is contrary to its 
essential character to do-so in a way which is sometimes dehumanising. One can 
be a convinced member of a religious faith community and tradition, to argue 
for its truth-claims, and to participate in the shaping of society in terms of its 
values, without triumphalism and in co-operation and dialogue with people of
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other faiths. As in so many other aspects of our South African common life, the 
need for tolerance and mutual understanding is a priority.
The origins of the South African Academy of Religion can be traced back to two 
different sources. The idea originated in the Theological Society of South Africa 
when a proposal for the establishment of an Academy of Religion was accepted 
at the Society’s annual congress in Port Elizabeth in 1990. This was then 
communicated to other cognate societies for their deliberation and response. 
Quite independently, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) was 
engaged in sponsoring annual theological conferences of an interdisciplinary 
nature on a biennial basis. After consultation between the various societies and 
the HSRC, it was agreed to convene an exploratory meeting towards the end of 
1992. Professors Willem Vorster of the University of South Africa and Johann 
Mouton of the HSRC, who had been involved in the planning of the theological 
conferences, very kindly agreed to convene this meeting, and through their 
efforts, the HSRC agreed to provide the necessary secretarial assistance and 
financial help. Eleven societies were represented at this exploratory meeting 
which agreed to proceed with the establishment of the Academy. An interim 
executive committee was elected to prepare the way, of which it my privilege to 
be elected chair and thus to preside at the founding Congress. In that capacity 
I wish to acknowledge the help of the HSRC, without whose support the 
launching of SAAR would not have been possible. I also wish to thank all those 
who shared in the planning of the congress, those who contributed essays to this 
volume, and especially my co-editor Steve Martin whose diligent editorial labours 
have proved indispensable.
The untimely death at the beginning of 1993 of one of the key members of the 
interim executive committee, Professor Willem Vorster, was a considerable blow 
to the fledgling Academy and to scholarship more widely in South Africa. We 
are glad, however, that we can remember his role in the formation of SAAR in 
dedicating this volume to his memory. SAAR was formally constituted on 
Wednesday 18 January 1994 when its constitution was adopted. Professor Simon 
Maimela elected its first President, and a Board was appointed to serve until the 
next congress in 1996.
As already intimated, not all of the papers presented at the congress in 1994 
have been included here. Apart from anything else, that would have required a 
book of more than twice the size of this one. The essays included have been 
carefully selected, edited and revised for publication, and they have been grouped 
under three major headings: I. Introductory issues; II. Religion and religious 
traditions; and III. Religion and social change in South Africa. In making the 
selection we have been conscious of the need for both scholarly excellence,
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diversity of approach, and breadth of representation. We are delighted to include 
the opening address given at the congress by Professor Michael Pye who at that 
time was President of the International Association for the Study of Religion. 
Details of the other contributors are included in an appendix. It is our hope that 
the Academy, as well as this its first publication, will not only contribute to the 
scholarly debate about religion in South Africa and elsewhere, but also contri­





Religion and identity: 
Clues and threads
Michael Pye
RELIGIOUS FORCES AND ACADEMIC STRUCTURE
This paper is given on a very special occasion, namely the founding conference 
of the South African Academy of Religion. Since this new Academy is an 
institution, or an organisation, the paper will begin with some reflections on the 
relation between religious forces and academic structures. We shall then move 
on to wider questions about religion and identity which are of importance 
throughout the world, and which are at the same time of particular relevance to 
South Africa at this time of highly significant political change.1
Religious forces and academic structures have long stood in a complex rela­
tionship with each other. Many universities began with religious foundations, not 
only in the western world but also in Asia. At the same time, the major critiques 
of religion have also been purveyed in universities, often to the consternation of 
religions leaders and above all of religious followers. There is no immediate end 
to this interaction in sight. Its complexity is reflected, understandably enough, in 
our other kinds of academic association, our societies, and academies. It may 
also be seen in the generously vague labelling of subjects such as ‘religious 
studies’. There is therefore sometimes a danger of heavily incursive religious 
motivation or sponsorship, which in turn may turn out to be a threat to 
freewheeling academic reflection.2
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Looking at this situation positively, people come to religious studies from various 
contributory backgrounds, and it is therefore quite natural and necessary that 
there should be an on-going process of what I (Pye 1991) have previously called 
‘discipline identification’. The establishment of this new body, The South African 
Academy of Religion, which (as I understand) will have several differentiated 
constituent associations, will help greatly in clarifying the relations between the 
study of religion, Biblical studies, and theology, and in permitting appropriate 
interactions between them. Such good arrangements will assist an incoming 
generation of scholars to clarify their objectives and methods without strife.3 It 
will also share in the much needed stabilisation of the relationship between the 
intellectual, reflective study of religion on the one hand and the hopes and fears 
of believing, and often disagreeing, communities on the other hand.
The influence and power of religions in the world today is really quite surprising 
for those who have felt, in one way or another, the force of critical philosophy 
or even just the vague attraction of liberal humanism. Similarly, sociologists, who 
have spent considerable effort in the discussion of secularisation processes, 
whether in the context of godless western materialism or of communist atheism, 
are now having to redirect their efforts.4 Recently, they have concentrated more 
attentively on a lively resurgence of religion almost all over the globe, either in 
neo-traditional or complicatedly novel forms, or both. The data-handling, 
communications, and media revolution is also relevant. It means that some forms 
of religion have become much more immediately available globally and that 
individual choice, or individually directed manipulation, has been multiplied. The 
New Age is everywhere at once, and the tele-evangelism of America can be 
matched by the healing shows in Russia (which have however just been banned 
by presidential decree). The effects of such trends are important but partial. One 
should take care not to be carried away by buzz-words such as ‘globalism’ and 
‘post-modernism’. They are often used by those who do not write from conti­
nuous involvement in real communities, or who do not carry out long-term field 
work. Much of the reality of religion is not global but parochial, not effervescent 
but persistent, not a matter of light, individual choice but of inescapable 
communal realities. In many countries there is a heavy investment in religious 
symbol systems for the negotiation of community strife, and, alas less often, for 
the negotiation of peace. For this we need look no further than the United 
Kingdom or the Republic of South Africa. But if we do look further, we will find 
it again and again. The media in the UK currently have about four scenes in 
view where questions of religion and identity have particular prominence: 
Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Sudan, and Palestine/Israel.
In 1994 it is still worth noting that the end of the Cold War, and the related 
unblocking of various other political processes, appear to have many religions in
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an unexpectedly strong position. This at least is the way things are widely 
perceived. Yet care is needed here. Historians in future may well conclude that 
religion was much stronger all along than the dominating political and 
journalistic powers in the western world wanted us to believe. For example, the 
situation in Poland is subtle. It is arguable that the national identity value of 
Catholicism in Poland was greater before 1989 than it has been since. After the 
formation of the non-communist government, at least some sectors of the 
population began to be wary of Catholic triumphalism, and enthusiasm for 
religion seemed to slip just a little more than it had ever done under communist 
government pressure. There is no longer an Association for the Promotion of 
Lay Culture in Poland, and yet we may be seeing the hesitant beginnings of a 
new phase of secular culture in that country. The very perception, however, that 
religions are today enjoying a resurgence in the countries concerned, has a fly­
wheel effect on their political influence, as for example in the case of Orthodoxy 
in Russia or Islam in the central Asian states.
This all means that the study of religion, or if the looser term be preferred, 
‘religious studies’, is of greater relevance than ever before. It is quite essential 
for some of us to study religion, and today this inevitably means religions in the 
plural, whether we are positively disposed to the truth claims of any specific 
religion or not. It would indeed be worthwhile, as I am sure many present would 
agree, to study religion simply because it is interesting. Let us not fear to point 
out, however, that it is necessary to study religion because of its actual 
importance.
‘Religion’ refers here, of course, not merely to the formal theologies of particular 
churches, though these are indeed fascinating for the specialist. Rather, the scope 
of the study of religion extends to a wide range of movements and worldview 
orientations, to the ways in which meaning is projected through a great variety 
of symbolic systems, to patterns of behaviour and belief which are perhaps more 
disturbing, even violent, than those which are positively sanctioned in formal 
teaching or in gentle inter-faith dialogues. Consider the storming and destruction 
of the mosque at Ayodha in India. Consider insistent claims to land made today, 
but based on biblical stories and the allusions of long distant times, often 
simplistically and inaccurately presented. Such matters can only be properly 
perspectivised if there is a well articulated domain of academic discourse in this 
field. Mere journalism often fails to get it quite right. Politicians, of course, do 
not necessarily even want to get it quite right, though some do. What is ‘right’ 
is a matter of judgment and not of research. But are we not permitted to hope 
that study may inform good judgment and play its part in preserving humankind 
from further follies?
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The foundation of this new South African Academy of Religion is indeed, I 
believe, a most auspicious occasion. It comes at a time of hope and trembling 
for the new South Africa, as the world awaits the first run-through of elections 
on the basis of universal suffrage. The creation of a new institutions within such 
a political context sets marks for a long time to come. May this particular 
institution set the right marks in its chosen field, and may the fruits of its 
endeavours be harvested by later generations. The structuring of academic 
enquiry is, as I have already said, a matter of real importance, and I would like 
to make three further comments on this development.
First, an academy such as this is a most important welcome organisational force 
in the discipline or disciplines which it incorporates. Needless to say, the ground 
has been prepared by the academic labours of many over the years. I am able 
to speak at least for one sector represented here when I say, as Secretary- 
General of the International Association for the History of Religions, that South 
African scholars and scholarship in this field have been internationally known 
and respected for a very long time. It is a matter of historical record that the 
South African Association for the Study of Religion has been affiliated to our 
international group for many years and remained so throughout the period of 
sanctions. In spite of sanctions-related decisions taken by individual scholars in 
other countries, worthy of respect in themselves, it seems that the decision of our 
association to attempt political non-alignment, and by implication to maintain 
contacts through the years, has been broadly vindicated. To put it in wider 
context: in 1992, the International Association for the History of Religions, 
unusually, held two regional conferences in the same year. The first was in 
Beijing, China. The second was in Harare, Zimbabwe, and was attended by 
several colleagues from South Africa. The next major congress will be in Mexico 
City in 1995, and I hope a good number of South African colleagues will find the 
time and funds to attend. I think this perspective speaks for itself. It is in such 
a pro-active mode that the International Association for the History of Religions 
has sought to be no more a political body than it is, in itself, a religious body.
Second, the coming into being of the South African Academy of Religion as an 
academic institution implies a widespread intellectual readiness to observe 
religion reflectively, and not merely to be swayed by it, or to use it. If the study 
of religion takes place in a context of rapid change, high aspirations, political 
tensions, conflict, and in some cases tragedy, then it is quite essential to be clear­
headed about the objectives and possible functions of this kind of study. One 
fairly common solution is simply to adopt a severe historico-philological stance 
in the attempt to secure the integrity of academic study. However, this could 
amount to mere protectionism and be little more than an alibi for refusing to 
look at the real world. If academics think at all about their own role in culture
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and in society, then surely the matter has to be more complex. On the other 
hand, it would be wrong to think that just anything goes in ‘religious studies’. 
The key lies, surely, in being able to distinguish complementary levels of 
discourse or steps of argument. Put very briefly, we may surely differentiate 
between the elucidation of sources (oral, written or material), the phenomeno­
logical characterisation of a specific religious complex (a difficult task not to be 
despised as ‘mere description’), the attempt to handle comparison and morpho­
logy, the search for theory and explanation, and the readiness to enter into 
debate. If these steps are adequately differentiated (even if formulated somewhat 
variously), then a wide range of academic discourse, though complex, can work 
in favour of reflective and humane understanding.
Third, the very foundation of this Academy surely implies, among other things, 
a profound recognition of the plurality of religions. Studies of religion in South 
Africa have, in fact, been fed over the years by a strong awareness that this 
plurality has a social importance. Religions arise, flourish, and decline in close 
association with the paths of specific communities, and even whole peoples, in 
their multiplicity. This is true for South Africa and, in another related and 
intertwined history, it is true for the United Kingdom. As many have realised in 
both these countries and elsewhere, it is hardly possible to understand national 
or community-based identities without reference to religion. On account of the 
extreme topicality of these matters in many parts of the world, but without 
presuming to make any further specific reference to South Africa, I would like 
to continue by presenting a few more general clues and threads which may add 
to the understanding of this theme of identity and religion.
RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
It will be well known that the theme of ‘identity’ has itself attracted tremendous 
interest, some of which was reflected in the proceedings of the fifteenth Con­
gress of the International Association for the History of Religions, entitled 
Identity Issues and World Religions (Hayes 1986). Here I shall leave aside the 
more philosophical questions about the meaning of the term, the question of 
psychological identity and the role of religion in the formation of individual 
personality, and yet other questions about the diachronic and synchronic 
coherence and identity of religious systems.5 The main point under consideration 
will be religion as a focus of social identity, where religions, however, are 
understood to be traditions of substantial symbolic power which have their own 
characteristic dynamics.
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It is widely assumed that religion is important in identifying who people are. 
There will not be much debate about this. Similarly, it is widely assumed that 
language identifies who people are. Thus English people think Frenchmen are 
people who speak French. This is a problem, they think, which begins at Calais. 
For completeness’ sake I will add that colour and physiognomy have often been 
assumed to identify who people are. People have been killed for all of these 
characteristics alone or in combination. In general, people are not strongly aware 
that these characteristics do not necessarily match up with each other. What 
language does a Bosnian Muslim speak? How poorly these matters are under­
stood!
It is also commonly not understood that the functions of different religions are 
more diverse for their various adherents or believers than those of languages are 
(more or less) for their speakers. In this respect, religions are different from 
languages. People understand that languages, though mostly incomprehensible 
to those outside the language group, share the common function of communi­
cation at least within their own group. Even though the function of language and 
of languages is not really that simple, it may be said that the common function 
of communication far outweighs any secondary range of functions which might 
be advanced. I think we may dare say that the function of religion or religions 
is even more complex than that of language. Religions are not all the same kind 
of thing, and they have different functions. Not only are secondary typologies 
possible, and by this I mean typologies which go beyond the kind of botanical 
variation that is found in language, but such typological effort is necessary in 
order to explicate the complexities of what is going on and avoid falling into the 
superstitions of the man or woman in the street. Unfortunately, the complexities 
of religion are often misunderstood, and sometimes wilfully misunderstood and 
manipulated by politicians.
PRIMAL RELIGION AND CRITICAL RELIGION
It appears to me that much of the confusion over questions of identity and 
religion arises because of a misunderstanding about the relationship between 
what may be called ‘primal religion’ on the one hand and ‘critical religion’ on the 
other. The history of this distinction, though not usually put in just these terms, 
is quite complex, but as far as I know has not been carefully traced. It would 
appear that a systematic morphology of religion can hardly avoid running into 
this problem at a very early stage, even if the proposed definitions have varied 
somewhat and are not all acceptable.6 The terms selected here will need further 
explanation below, but in brief I mean (a) religions which are coterminous with 
a specific, natural society and (b) religions which stand in some tension to
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natural society and provide a differentiated perspective upon it. Let us assume 
for the moment that it is indeed possible to make some such distinction between 
these two. The interesting thing to note is that the distinction, though initially 
plausible, in many cases does not seem to hold good.
This requires further explanation. In a simple typology of religion and identity 
there are two poles which can be discerned with relative ease, if we build on the 
initial distinction made above. The first is the consciously equated identity of a 
specific, primal religion with a natural society whose borders are believed to be 
known. The second is the world-related identity of soteriological or critical 
religions which in principle advance universal claims for the attention of human­
kind. For the moment, let it be added that, difficult though it is to define such 
fixed terms to the satisfaction of others, the real complexities arise out of the 
interactions between these two kinds of religion and even more so out of 
complete crossovers. A clear crossover occurs when a religion which has been 
thought by many to be the salvation of all humankind is brought into the service 
as the primal religion of one specified group which seeks to protect or promote 
itself alone.
Consider two examples of great worldwide importance. Christianity, as its repre­
sentatives would often agree and indeed claim, is a soteriological, and therefore 
by extension, a universal religion. Yet in its specific forms, it has often been used 
to demonstrate the identity of apparently natural communities. Obvious examples 
are Catholicism in Poland during the Cold War period (To be Polish is to be 
Catholic’ was a current explanation), Catholicism and Protestantism in opposition 
in Northern Ireland, Orthodoxy and Catholicism in opposition in Serbia and 
Croatia (of what was Yugoslavia), and Protestantism for significant groups of 
whites in South Africa. Much the same may be said of Buddhism. The teaching 
principle of Buddhism, being about release from the ills of this life, is in 
principle a teaching for all human beings, or sentient beings, everywhere. For 
this profound reason it has been recognised in modern India as able to lift 
people out of the discriminatory caste system. Ironically, this same Buddhist 
movement in India, which began under the leadership of the Buddhist modernist 
Dr Ambedkar, now seems to have settled down into being a mark of community 
identity. It is well known that Buddhism has been important in the creation of 
national identity in other countries such as Sri Lanka (anti-colonialist and anti- 
Tamil), Thailand (‘to be Thai is to be Buddhist’, as the saying goes), Tibet (anti- 
foreign and anti-Chinese), Mongolia and Buryatia (anti-Soviet, and in Mongolia 
recently anti-foreign), Korea and Japan (partial responses to invasive foreign 
culture).
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However, there is a simple reason for all this, namely that the two main types 
mentioned above do not exist in a socio-cultural vacuum. They interact with each 
other, as of course with various other social factors, and in the course of their 
development either type may take on significant features of the other. This leads 
to crossovers of intention and function between the two most fundamental types 
of religion. This in turn leads to complications, and sometimes confusion, in our 
picture of the relations between religion and identity.
When trying to consider such matters satisfactorily, the specialist in religion will 
have the usual questions about the diachronic and synchronic identity of religious 
traditions at the back of his or her mind. He or she will also bear in mind the 
phenomenological call to take the consciousness of the believer or tradition- 
bearer with great seriousness, whatever the apparent plausibility or implausibility 
of the truth-claims which may be asserted or implied. It would also appear that 
the matter can be further clarified if these types of religion are correlated with 
major types of ritual. This seems to me to be one of the more important clues 
in understanding what is going on and will, therefore, be explained further below.
None of these theoretical foci, however, are well understood in the media or by 
politicians. Sometimes, indeed, politicians understand these things only too well 
at a kind of instinctive level, and are able to manipulate the dynamics of religious 
tradition in their own interests. That is, politicians are sometimes able to use 
religions whose teachings apparently transcend discrimination by caste or race 
to set such discriminations in place and defend them. These matters certainly 
demand careful attention.
PRIMAL RELIGION
First, consider briefly the term ‘primal religion’, with which some dissatisfaction 
has been expressed. This is mainly because it sounds a bit like ‘primitive’, which 
has often been used as an insulting term. Yet ‘primal’ is not the same word as 
‘primitive’, and it may be hoped that we may yet be allowed to save it to be used 
in its own right. Another difficulty is that it has, in general, been limited to the 
context of small-scale and often pre-literate societies. However, this limitation 
is not obligatory. Indeed, I myself find the term extremely useful in the analysis 
of contemporary Japanese religion, in a society which is highly literate and not 
exactly small-scale. The main value of the word ‘primal’ is that it suggests some 
kind of fundamental priority, though this does not necessarily have to be chrono­
logical in all cases. It is therefore a valuable term as one of a pair, where the 
other term may stand in dialectical relationship to it.
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Primal religion gives recognition to the ancestral lineage of a specific family, clan 
or nation, and to the myths and legends which articulate it. It secures social 
continuity by means of rites of transition, and it secures the economic base of 
society so perceived by calendrical rites. In emergency, occasional rites are also 
available, for example, to avert drought or epidemic, or, in Britain, to avert 
undue rainfall. The conceptual perspective is characterised by cosmological 
symbolism suggesting repetition and stability, in spite of known dangers. Divine 
power is understood to be focused or located in a particularistic, and therefore 
polytheistic, mode. Thus, meaning is geographically delimited and distant, 
exogenous groups are of little interest, except as a potential threat.
A clear example of a primal religion in this sense is Shinto. Admittedly, Shinto 
has adapted to a variety of complex developments over many centuries, and may 
therefore be termed ‘adjusted primal religion’. Moreover, Shinto in modern 
times has lost its relationship to natural Japanese society as a whole. At the 
same time, the place of primal religion, in Japan, has been occupied by a new 
amalgam from various sources in which almost the whole population participates. 
It would be an unnecessary diversion to pursue this particular thesis at this point. 
Note, however, that it requires the application of the term ‘primal religion’ in the 
context of one of the world’s most advanced societies. There is no question of 
any inappropriate correlation with ‘primitive’.
The problem in social and political development is to extend the mixture and the 
range of any given primal religion to cater for the newly emerging parameters 
of the group or nation. Thus, there was discourse in ancient times about the way 
in which the gods of different parts of Japan were related as members of a far- 
flung family. In fact, such stories may still be heard today in country shrines. The 
diversity and the interwoveness of the myths betrays a hard-won political unity 
which undoubtedly was paid for with much suffering. Japanese today often make 
a point of their ethnic homogeneity, for which they are very thankful. The reality 
is that in distant times they were almost certainly ethnically diverse, or at least 
diffuse. Probably they were not so varied, objectively speaking, as the races of 
modern South Africa. Yet at the same time of political stress, the difference 
does not need to be great, it only needs to be perceived for it to be troublesome. 
Thinking along these lines, could South Africa find new, coherent symbols which 
take in more of its complex lineage in one single interwoven story? Or is this too 
simple? Does the modern equivalent to such processes lie, rather, in multiple 
access to a variety of symbols, which would have to be latently held available by 
a benevolently secular state?7 This might even seem to verge, ambivalently, on 
post-modernity. But if another example of a society in rapid change be consi­
dered, namely Russia, it must be said that such ambivalence does not seem to 
be generally desired. Rather, there is a strong move to protect Russian Ortho­
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doxy, against alternative evangelists and faith-healers, as the only strong soul of 
the nation.
CRITICAL RELIGION
Turning to the second term of the proposed pair, there are several options to 
consider. Though ‘critical’ is preferred, the main line of my present argument 
does not depend heavily on the choice made. The same religions are commonly 
regarded as being ‘soteriological’ or ‘universal’ in their purport, though I see 
some difficulties with these terms.
It might indeed be helpful, provisionally, to suggest ‘soteriological’ as a synonym. 
The point about soteriological religion is that it implies that natural life as 
normally lived is not satisfactory and that, therefore, some kind of salvation or 
release from it is necessary. However, ‘soteriological’ may suggest rather too 
firmly the function of a saviour figure (soter). When it comes to meditational 
systems such as Jainism or Buddhism, or modern programmes of self-realisation, 
a saviour figure is often less important and thus the term ‘soteriological’ would 
be a little misleading - in spite of the important role which a spiritual teacher 
may play. What any such religions have in common is that individuals, or some­
times family groups, are separated out of natural society which is ordered by 
primal religion, and this implies a criticism of the latter. Thus, ‘leaving the 
household life’ is not an idle phrase in Buddhism; rather, it reflects a structuring 
feature based on the model of the ‘great renunciation’ of the Buddha himself.
As to the term ‘universal religion’, by which is meant a religion with a universal 
claim, this is open to misunderstanding for three reasons. First, the universal 
claim of ‘religions of salvation or release’ arises out of conviction that the initial, 
critical awareness, or even renunciation of daily life, and the consequently 
elaborated path of the believer or follower, are of value for other people as well 
as oneself. This is a very natural conclusion to draw. However, the initial 
movement in which critical conviction is conceived is logically prior, and in the 
formative period it is usually chronologically prior. It therefore seems better to 
emphasise it. This is clearly true for Buddhism, where the Great Renunciation 
of the Buddha and his ‘going forth into homelessness’ naturally preceded his 
attainment of Enlightenment, which is in turn the condition for announcing the 
Dhamma or teaching to his first disciples. Interestingly, there is among the 
narratives about the various parts of the Buddha’s life a legend about who he 
had to be persuaded to teach at all. He was persuaded, the story goes, by the 
god Brahma, and then only after being asked three times and being given cogent 
arguments to consider. We can see from this example that the universal claim
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emerges secondarily, if naturally enough, from the critical or soteriologjcal 
consciousness.
Second, the question of claims to universal validity is complicated in that primal 
religion also, though in any one case limited to a specific natural society, can be 
found (more or less) in all societies. Primal religion might therefore itself be 
argued to be universal in a different way, that is, simply in that it occurs 
generally. In fact, this would seem to be the main avenue of interpretation open 
for those today who wish to maintain the character of a primal religion while 
coming to terms with the evident existence and impact of external societies. 
Shinto is a case in point. But this would be a different discussion altogether, and 
since the concept of universalism could occur in both discussions it is better to 
avoid it at the first level of morphological differentiation.
Third, primal religions sometimes produce their own universalising forms. 
Hinduism is a fine example of this. But the matter belongs under the heading of 
‘crossovers’, for which see further below.
Let us turn briefly to the rituals characteristic of critical religions. They are 
rather different from those typical of primal religions. Above all, critical religions 
require two basic types of ritual. One is needed to incorporate the newly 
convinced into a community which may be both less than and more than the 
natural society to which they have belonged. The simplest ordination by the 
Buddha with the phrase ‘Come, monk!’ is an example of this. Christian baptism 
of believers is another. These rituals may be called rites of ‘incorporation’. The 
second basic type of ritual is needed to maintain the critically separated 
individual in the new community. The Buddhist uposalha rite is a good example; 
the Christian Eucharist is another. These may be called ‘rites of reinforcement’. 
These two types of ritual are typical for critical religions and pertain to their 
fundamental nature. They can be observed especially clearly in new religious 
movements with a strong soteriological consciousness which have not yet adapted 
heavily to the surrounding society.
CROSSOVERS
This might all seem to be very straightforward if the picture would only remain 
simple in the actual history of religions. However, it does not. Primal religions 
colour quite deeply the critical religions which arise in their context. Critical 
religions, having a universal message, tend to expand their claims and pervade 
natural societies. Some are more ‘tolerant’ than others, leaving things to some 
extent as they are, while others take over more and more functions. In fact, even
13
Buddhism is not as ‘tolerant’ as is sometimes thought. In several cultures, it has 
taken over funeral rites, typical of primal religion, which in themselves have little 
to do with the Buddha’s Dharma as such. Similarly, in South-east Asia and Sri 
Lanka, Buddhist ordination has taken on characteristics of an adolescent rite of 
transition for males. Christianity has largely allowed baptism to become a rite 
of transition for infants, and confirmation (separated from baptism) a rite of 
transition for adolescents. Birth, marriage, and death are times for going to 
church, it is often said, in societies where Christianity has become the primal 
norm and is no longer the critical difference.
Even more complicatedly, primal religions have not only been the matrix of 
critical religions which have distanced themselves dialectically (Buddhism from 
Brahmanism, Christianity from Judaism) but they have also given rise to 
secondary forms which seem to be a universal message, as in universalising 
forms of Hinduism or some of the new religions derived from Shinto shrines 
(Kurozumikyo, Taishakyo).
For these reasons, both main types of religion display ambivalent tendencies over 
identity. This leads to questions about change in specific religious traditions. But 
the specialist in religion will be interested in these, not merely as circumstantial 
historical alteration, but as questions of dynamics to be understood in terms of 
an overall typology.
The phenomena I have mentioned are, in general, well known, and I have pur­
posely chosen very obvious examples. The point, however, lies in the crossover 
of functions. The crossover of functions becomes of particular importance when 
questions of identity are considered. On a simple theory, there is a distinction 
between the delimiting identity of primal religions, each reinforcing its own 
natural group, and the trans-cultural identity of communities, like the Christian 
Church or the Buddhist Sangha, which are conscious of being critically extracted 
from the natural situation. Religious people themselves, we may observe, usually 
have a sensitive awareness of social and conceptual continuity in religion. In 
complex ways, it is this which enables switches to be made between the two 
poles of identity. As soon as the critical religions pervade natural societies and 
take on the role, or some of the roles, of primal religion for the new environ­
ment, then a primal identity formation takes over and a religion with universal 
implications can come to be the badge of a particular people. This, in turn, may 
lead to conflicts which seem to stand in contradiction to the original impulses of 
the faith in question.
In conclusion, I would emphasise once more the extreme sensitivity of all those 
questions in the great variety of actual cases. It might be thought that, academi­
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cally speaking, the matter could be left to rest there. The needs of society are 
sufficiently great and urgent, however, for theoretical impulses of this kind to be 
fed through into educational and media-led consciousness. If there is a wider 
understanding of these matters, then there may be more chances of dealing with 
them constructively in our modern, pluralist societies.
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NOTES
I am very grateful for the support of the South African Human Sciences 
Research Council for allowing the possibility to be present at the 
inaugural congress of the South African Academy of Religion.
I have dwelt on these matters in some detail in my inaugural lecture at 
Lancaster University entitled ‘Religion: shape and shadow* (1994). 
This point is of particular interest for the writer who is currently looking 
at it as Secretary-General for the International Association for the 
History of Religions, to which the Southern African Association for the 
Study of Religion has been affiliated for some time. Some readers will 
be aware that there has been considerable controversy in some quarters 
about the ways in which the ‘history of religions’ (a phrase with more 
meaning than is sometimes realised) or the ‘study of religions’ may be 
associated, if at all, with church-related, theological, or other religiously 
motivated studies. There are indeed real difficulties here, for which see 
the references in the two previous footnotes. However it is of great 
importance, particularly at times of political stress and creativity, that 
people in fact talk to each other, both in specific countries and also 
internationally, and contribute to the wider formation of ideas. The 
answer may lie in genuine mutual respect, a realistic understanding of 
different kinds of motivation which may be brought to bear on reflection 
about religion, and in a fair and open structuring of the relevant 
associations and institutions so that the dangers of manipulation and 
majorisation are avoided. The South African Academy of Religion looks 
set to avoid these dangers which, it must be said, have not always been 
avoided elsewhere.
David Martin, for instance, has recently authored a substantial work on 
the pentecostalist movement in Latin America.
These latter were discussed in Hubert Seiwart’s paper ‘What constitutes 
the identity of a religion?’ which was set first in the proceedings 
mentioned above (Hayes 1986:1-7). The questions treated under this 
heading have also been handled as problems about the ‘essence’ of reli­
gious tradition (i e of any one such), and as problems about the 
morphology of religious systems encountered during fieldwork, without 
any necessary reference to the term identity.
Any attempt at a morphology of religion must, surely begin with 
selected major distinctions which help to bring out important charac­
teristics. Nathan Soderblom was following exactly the same procedure 
in principle when he mounted a distinction between prophetic and 
mystical religion and sought to assign specific religions to each of these 
types. Ninian Smart did the same, a little more complicatedly, in his
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work Reasons and Faiths, when he wrote of the mystical, the numinous 
and the incarnational ‘strands’. Both had different priorities in mind and 
were still mainly concerned with coming to terms with the sheer exis­
tence of the religions of Asia.
This would be akin to what David Chidester (1991) has called for in the 
conclusion to his book Shots in the streets: Violence and religion in South 
Africa. For a perspicacious and detailed survey of the overall situation 
see the same author’s (1992) Religions o f South Africa.
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CHAPTER 2
The importance of starting from both 
ends: An appreciative response to 
Michael Pye’s keynote address
John S Cumpsty
INTRODUCTION
The original format of this paper was a somewhat insular plea for a greater 
concern with theory. Michael Pye’s Keynote address called forth a change. 
Although Pye’s area of special interest is Japan, his paper had an understood 
(although carefully understated) relevance to Africa that needed to be responded 
to. I have, therefore, taken the liberty of redirecting my paper to the most 
important point that Pye made in his context appropriate paper - the distinction 
between, and coexistence of, ‘primal’ and ‘soteriological’ religion. Both of us are 
deeply concerned with this issue, and he has graciously agreed that I should 
proceed thus.
That this discussion is relevant to religious studies is pastorally, practically, and 
scientifically evident. Pastorally, for those in Africa, the discussion concerns the 
consequences of retaining those elements of traditional religion which seem to 
participate strongly in African identity while, at the same time, embracing Chris­
tianity or Islam.
Practically, as always where two approaches offer related insights, the discussion 
concerns presentation and language. Is it better to present religious traditions as 
falling into two types, the one rooting, the other lifting out? This approach leans 
toward the possibility that one might embrace both but, inadvertently, seems to
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suggest a superiority in the latter. Or, is it better to present them as falling into 
three viable options on the same level? This approach inevitably emphasises their 
logical incompatibility and the costs of mixing them).
Scientifically, the discussion concerns what might be gained, and what might be 
risked, by developing an explanatory theory ‘theoretically5, rather than under the 
close control of the empirical. It is about the possibility of starting from the 
other end - with what an individual might be supposed to be doing when being 
religious - and asking about religion’s most basic entities and the processes of 
their interrelation; processes out of which are constructed the mosaics of almost 
infinite variety which constitute actual religious traditions.
If one begins empirically, then what one handles is, from the beginning, as near 
to real as can be determined. While not necessarily providing a better description 
of reality, at least one feels it is well founded. If one begins theoretically, the 
validity of the exercise can only emerge, way down the line, in the experience 
that it is enriching.
If one begins the study of religion empirically, one is restricted to types o f 
distilled in the field. If one begins theoretically, one brings to the debate, not 
‘types of, but ideal types which arise only from theoretical considerations. These 
ideal types are logically coherent and mutually exclusive, serving to establish a 
clear framework in which actual traditions can be located and explained. They 
may not, however, be represented without remainder in any actual tradition. 
Such ideal types can sometimes be absent from an actual tradition, sometimes 
present on their own, and sometimes be mixed, but there cannot, of course, be 
what Pye calls ‘crossovers’ within them.
Along with those who work from either end researchers who deal with the im­
pact of what they understand to be religion upon entities in their own field of 
interest - which can be anything from society to fine art. If their understanding 
of what constitutes religion is to be clarified and their findings to become inte- 
gratable with those of others, then a common language is called for. Without a 
common language, the findings of field studies can never become shared. A 
common language requires the definition of terms, and of the relations between 
terms, which is already the beginning of theory. Theory is a discipline’s universal 
language.
This does not, of course, diminish the importance of an empirical concern with 
field study. On the contrary, the validity of theory can only be tested in its power 
to explain, as simply and as ‘fruitfully5 as possible, the data generated in the field. 
Theory in a vacuum is no theory; but neither can the theorist reach into the
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detail of every fieldworker’s data. It is essential that hands-on researchers reach 
out to theory by distilling ‘types of, so that theoretically generated ‘types’ might 
be challenged and, hopefully, be validated.
It is helpful, therefore, to find field work bridging out toward theory, as Michael 
Pye does. Among those who start with the complexity of actual traditions he has 
come nearer to where I arrive theoretically than any other researcher I know 
and, in the process, has seen things I failed to see.
Starting from the theoretical end generates basic conceptual entities which 
enable the division of Pye’s ‘soteriological’ type into two as sharply as he 
distinguishes that from the primal type. They also break down further his 
category ‘primal’. Beginning with an account of his categories, I wish to show the 
advantages of making those moves.
PYE ON PRIMAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL RELIGION
Pye distinguishes two types of religious tradition; their titles reflecting meanings 
arising from their interaction. Each is ‘a valuable term as one of a pair’ (plO).1
While he prefers to call the first type ‘critical’, reflecting its stance over against 
the second, which he calls ‘primal’, he is happy to use the term ‘soteriological’ 
if it is not too literally applied. Earlier, he (1989:186) wrote of a ‘salvation’ 
tradition - a more general term less suggestive of a ‘saviour’. In this paper he 
settles for soteriological.
Pye uses ‘primal’ in a rather special and positive sense. By ‘primal’, he means a 
tradition that is consciously equated with a natural society whose borders are 
believed to be known. It ‘gives recognition to ancestral lineage of a specific 
family, clan or nation ...’ (p ll). ‘It secures social continuity by means of rites of 
transition, and it secures the economic base of society so perceived by calendrical 
rites’ (p ll). ‘The conceptual perspective is characterised by cosmological symbo­
lism suggesting repetition and stability (p ll). ‘Divine power is understood to 
be focused or located in a particularistic and therefore polytheistic mode’ (p ll).
In my terms (which do not, I believe, distort Pye’s intent), ‘soteriological’ refers 
to religious traditions with a goal to be achieved; that is, where the adherent 
seeks to be related to a transcendent, or a not yet fully apprehended, reality. 
They therefore tend to the universal. Primal religion, on the other hand, keeps 
one rooted in this present reality. It is a present reality affirming monism, 
geographically (or presumably otherwise) limited to a community or nation.
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The distinctions that Pye offers to us are types of religious tradition. They are the 
distilled experience of a hands-on specialist in the field, and they seem to me to 
be much better descriptive categories than any previously offered. They are more 
universal and they get nearer to being primary variables (variables which cannot 
be usefully broken down further) than any other. Nevertheless, his categories 
‘primal’ and ‘soteriological’ each need a further bifurcation. Then the 
complexities he describes will resolve more clearly.
Before I set out to describe the further bifurcations I have in mind, I wish to 
continue exploring the complex relation between primal and soteriological reli­
gion. I wish to consider a number of (otherwise unrelated) situations which raise 
interesting questions when the categories ‘primal’ and ‘soteriologicar are brought 
to bear upon them. I do this because they are also situations in which the addi­
tional bifurcations that I have in mind either further focus the problem or cause 
it to disappear. I am, therefore, looking at some of them with a little tongue in 
cheek. I begin with Pye’s own field of expertise, then move into areas with which 
I am more familiar.
THE INTERACTION OF PRIMAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL RELIGION
It has been thought possible that the soteriological and the primal are so clearly 
distinct that they may be adhered to at the same time. But to what extent do 
people in fact hold them together? Is there a need to do so? What would be 
gained? What would be the costs?
At one point, Shinto (clearly in Pye’s classification a primal tradition) was 
declared not to be a religion, but ‘Japanese-ness’. All Japanese could be expected 
to abide by the requirements of Shinto, while not being prevented from adhering 
to the Buddhist, Christian, or presumably any other soteriological tradition (see 
Takayama 1988:328). While, for political reasons, this became a public issue in 
Japan, it is a de facto, although sometimes unconscious, state of affairs in many 
places. Consider a British Christian, with primal attachment to the ancient myths 
of King Arthur and Merlin, on the one hand, and a contemporary resentment 
of Arabs who buy bits of London, on the other. There are parallels to the latter 
aspect in the USA and Australia - most of which would never be thought of as 
religious, although others are associated with versions of Christianity that might 
be thought primal, in Pye’s use of the word. Similarly, it has been possible to say 
‘Buddhism is atheistic but Buddhists are not’.
On the overt level, almost everybody who ministers in Africa (and many who 
minister in India), are faced with the question of what to do about the fact that
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so many people live in, or between, two world-views represented by two overtly 
religious traditions. The question posed by Pye’s presentation of ‘complex cross­
overs’ - concerning the possibility of holding both types of tradition - is pastorally 
relevant. Would it be possible, for example, for African Traditional Religion to 
become soteriological, rather than Africans having to become Christians or 
Muslims in order to religiously enter the ‘modern’ world?
Members of the Church of Latter Day Saints have told me that their converts 
usually give up their old religion - except in Africa, where they keep the old and 
add the new. This may reflect a difference between converts from primal tradi­
tions and converts from other soteriological traditions, or from no tradition at 
all. It might also reflect the deep rooted quality of primal religion in Africa. But 
then there is also in India an indianness’ that seems to hang on in the face of 
developed forms of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. I think it more likely 
that the Mormons failed to perceive the things which hung on in their other con­
verts as religion at all, never mind primal religion, while in Africa they did. No 
one is a tabula rasa.
The prima facie evidence being what it is, one has to ask, not only how it is pos­
sible to hold to a primal and soteriological religion at the same time, but 
whether one needs to. Could it be that it would be easier, unless one were mar­
ginalised and desperate, to accept the measure of world renunciation in a sote­
riological faith if one were already securely rooted in a barely conscious primal 
one?
If the need to be rooted and the need to be liberated exist together, then human 
beings will have devised ways, over time, of holding the primal and the soterio­
logical together. Indeed, there seems to be evidence of this. Buddhism is parti­
cularly difficult to link conceptually with primal tradition because it holds the 
very opposite belief about the nature of immediate experience. But the evidence 
is that Buddhism both modified, and was modified, in contact with Shinto.2 Per­
haps this is because they are so different that they can be allocated to different 
parts of life, and not fight as other primal religions ‘fight’ with more overtly 
ethical traditions.
Anglicanism, which seems to cater for both needs, even in the same service, is 
a deliberate knitting together of much that is distinctly British (and apparently 
primal) with soteriological religion. Rejoicing in being British is linked, through 
Country and Queen, to Commonwealth, humanity, the whole natural order, and 
God.3 Paradoxically, with it goes the demand to be universal - and so to over­
come these very same boundaries.
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Judaism has long held together seemingly primal and soteriological features; that 
is, a rooting in people and land together with a universal ethic. The conflict 
between these two has become more obvious since the symbolic Zion became 
the actual Jerusalem. In Israel, what is thought of as a tension between religion 
and the secular is reflected in the oft quoted statement, ‘Judaism taught us not 
to persecute, Zionism taught us not to be persecuted, the problem is to hold 
them together’. But, perhaps Zionism is better thought of in terms of primal 
religion than secularity.
The most serious potential for division in Israel lies not between religion and a 
secular ideology, but in the religious tradition itself. The potential for division 
lies not only between the traditional symbols of people and land and the uni­
versal ethic, but also between them and traditional piety. This piety can function 
as a quietistic avoidance of the conflicting consequences of primal and soterio­
logical commitments (Cumpsty 1984). These potential divisions are serious 
because they are deeply and ubiquitously constitutive of Jewish identity.
In the end, even the most soteriological tradition requires the survival of the 
community which bears the tradition. So there will always be conflict between 
rootedness and universahsm; that is, between the survival values of individuals 
or small groups and the values for the survival of humanity and natural order - 
the latter calling for sacrifices in the area of the former.
It is in this tradition community sense that I read Desmond Tutu’s (1977:45) plea 
for an understanding of ‘Africanness’ that can, and should, be held together with 
Christianity. He uses ‘Africanness’ in a sense that would include the geographical 
and national but would go beyond it to include aspects of an African Traditional 
world-view whiqh would, in Pye’s terms, be primal.
There is perhaps something deeper still to be said about the primal and soterio­
logical thrusts. There is a sort of dance that humankind engages in once it has 
experienced a soteriological world-view. In part, this a consequence of success. 
When life experience is bad, there is a tendency to move away from the primal 
toward the soteriological; when it improves, perhaps because of the soteriological 
contribution, the soteriological is pressed to acknowledge some good in the 
primal. In this light, I have viewed the Mahayana tradition as a bridging back 
toward the primal from the more austerely soteriological Hinayana tradition.
Then again, where the soteriological tradition in question is dualistic about 
reality, this seems to set up a craving for a monistic world-view. This exists 
alongside the felt impossibility of going back to being a happy nature religionist 
once one has tasted the fruits of a grand purpose.4 There is, of course, an under­
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standable desire to have the best of both world-views. And there are always costs 
to identity, and to one’s logic of belonging, in doing that. But there is something 
more here. It seems that monism has a special appeal. When experience is 
acceptable but relatively static, the present-world-affirming variety of monism 
that we have been calling ‘primal’ is likely to appeal. When immediate 
experience is not so good, then a soteriological monism of the yet to be indivi­
dually realised (or apocalyptic incursion from without) variety is more likely to 
appeal. Either way, monism draws people, not least because, at the cognitive 
level, human beings seem to have a need to think their way across the transcen­
dence gap. However, if that appeal is responded to then, among those in whom 
the seed of transcendence has been sown, the dualistic tradition will eventually, 
and probably dramatically, reassert itself - particularly if, by the necessity of 
this-worldly goals such as migration (geographical or cultural) or some other 
shift to a stronger sense of linear time, one gets a reassertion of not-yet-ness. I 
perceive postmodernism as the latest swing to the epistemology of a present 
experience affirming monism, and wonder in what way the epistemology of the 
dualistic tradition will reassert itself.5
All this constitutes a very complex picture. I want to show that some of these 
complexities resolve if one further sub-divides Pye’s category ‘primal’ into an 
ideal type of religious tradition and, what I call, ‘aggregations significant in 
identity5; and his category ‘soteriological’ into monistic and dualistic ‘types’. To 
this task I now turn.
STARTING AT THE OTHER END - THEORY
What does it mean to start at the other end from the complex mosaic that com­
prises actual traditions? It is possible to be persuasive about the starting point 
of a theory, but the test of good theory lies in its use, not in what generates it. 
I will confine myself, therefore, to saying that any theory of religion must begin 
with religion as manifested in the individual. If religion did not do something for 
the individual, traditions would neither arise nor survive. I begin, therefore, with 
the general statement that religion is everywhere concerned with the individual’s 
drive to be linked to whatever he or she perceives to be the really real in 
experience. I ask the reader’s patience until the theory generated by progressively 
unpacking my definition demonstrates its usefulness.
My core definition is:
Religion is the quest for, realization or maintenance of, 
belonging to the ultimately-real, however that may be felt or 
conceived (see Cumpsty 1991: chapter 8).
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Belonging, therefore, has two aspects: a felt sense of the ultimately-real, together 
with a minimal conceptualisation of the same, and a mode of belonging to that 
ultimately-real.
Religious experience might be infinitely varied but, because the way in which we 
experience is not unrelated to what we believe, it is probable that religious 
experience is, in part, constrained by how we conceptualise reality. Either way, 
there are only three ways of conceptualising the reality to which one would 
belong.
Humankind’s primary response to the world-out-there is the uncomplicated 
monistic one: ‘this is the real’. It will remain this way for as long as the 
world-out-there can be affirmed as that to which one would belong, or, so long 
as no other possibility is envisaged. If total experience cannot be affirmed as 
experience of the real, in the sense of being that to which one would belong 
ultimately, then the quest for belonging will lead to a splitting of experience; that 
is, to the conceptual separating out of that which can be wholly affirmed, from 
that which cannot. This ‘splitting’, which establishes the distinctive character of 
what Pye calls ‘critical’ (or ‘soteriological’) traditions, can take only two forms. 
It can be modelled as a divide between reality and its appearance, or as a divide 
within reality itself.
In the first of these forms, the reason the immediate world-out-there cannot be 
affirmed is understood to lie in the individual’s perception. It cannot be related 
to as the real because it is not apprehended, either cognitively or affectively, as 
it is in itself. In this model, reality remains monistic, a closed system of cause 
and effect.
In the second form, the split lies in reality itself. There is a now, and a not-yet; 
a this, and a that which transcends it; a real, and an ultimately-real. This dicho­
tomy in reality, modelled temporally and spatially, is expected to be overcome 
when this and the transcendent come together and reality is experienced fully.
Thus there are three, and only three, paradigms for a reality to which one would 
belong. The latter paradigms begin with a built in bifurcation; that is, they begin 
with the expectation of something to be overcome. The first paradigm begins 
without such an expectation and, therefore, roots one in the present experience.
These three paradigms give rise to consequential symbols. Such concern whether 
reality is a closed system of cause and effect, or whether there is contingency and 
new beginnings; whether belonging is assumed, and therefore only needs to be 
maintained or realised, or whether it must be sought. They also concern whether
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time is linear, or cyclical and, therefore, whether the meaning of life is rooted 
in purpose, pattern, or just worthwhileness. Consequential symbols concern many 
other matters about the mode of engagement with the immediate 
world-out-there, social cohesion and coercion, sources of ethics, the modelling 
of survival after death and the nature of knowledge.
All symbols generated by a particular paradigm for reality are non-negotiable in 
the sense that to reject them is to reject the paradigm. The paradigms and their 
necessary consequential symbols give rise to flexible symbols which belong to the 
set, but among which alternatives are available, or upon which different
emphases are possible.
These three sets of symbols - a paradigmatic symbol together with its necessary 
and flexible consequential symbols - constitute three coherent types of religious 
tradition. They are ideal, and no actual religious tradition may fit without 
remainder into any one of them. Logically, however, they are mutually exclusive 
because their modes of engagement with the immediate world-out-there (to ‘fit 
into’, to ‘withdraw from’, to ‘take hold and shape’) are incompatible. Thus, they 
provide a permanent frame in which ever-shifting, actual traditions can be 
located, and movements explained.6
For reasons set out elsewhere, I (1991:117) have labelled these ideal types 
‘Nature Religion’, ‘Withdrawal Religion’, and ‘Secular World Affirming Religion’. 
Before discussing how a primal tradition will coexist with a soteriological tradi­
tion, we need to know which of the two soteriological types is present and, there­
fore, which consequential symbols are potentially in conflict.
The content of ‘Primal Religion’, as Pye has set it out, including, as it does, a 
geographical or other limitation, is more complex than my ‘Nature Religion’. To 
show where the difference lies I must introduce the concept of ‘aggregations 
significant in identity5 (see Cumpsty 1991: chapter 11).
Aggregations significant in identity
In secular world affirming religion the dualism in reality sets up three actors, the 
self, the ultimately-real (God), and the real (the world-out-there) - all of which 
must be interrelated if a cosmic sense of belonging is to exist.
Traditionally, the preacher pointed to the ultimately-real; but more pastoral con­
cerns made it clear that there can be no sense of belonging unless there is both 
an integrated sense of the ‘This’ that would belong, and an integrated sense of 
the ‘That’ to which one would belong. The broad parameters of ‘This’ are set by
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one’s understanding of ‘That’, but ‘This’ is filled out in its detail by relation to 
the world-out-there. It is with the details of this relation to the world-out-there, 
dictated by the need to belong, that I now wish to deal.
Few, if any, have a sense of belonging to anything as vague as ‘a culture’. Rather, 
one belongs consciously, and frequently unconsciously (until something triggers 
awareness of it), to various groupings whose values and aspirations are taken on 
when one perceives oneself to belong to the group. Part of individual identity will 
always be idiosyncratic, much of it, however, is formed by participation in the 
corporate identities of these groupings.
By an ‘aggregation significant in identity5, I mean simply a shared-values 
grouping as it is perceived by the one belonging to it. It might be as structured 
as ‘The Regimen’, as relatively unstructured as ‘Academia’, or as totally unstruc­
tured, by anything save the values themselves, as ‘Liberal’. Because each of these 
groupings might be thought of as a society, many religions, in Durkheim’s sense 
of the word, might contribute to one religion, in my sense.
An aggregation is, at once, part of the individual’s world-out-there, and a 
platform from which he or she relates to the rest of it.
A sense of cosmic belonging, a belonging to all-that-is-out-there, requires inter 
alia that the aggregations to which I perceive myself to belong are themselves 
capable of integration. That is, that aggregations on the same level have inte- 
gratible aspirations or, if not, that justice is perceived to oversee their 
competition. I must also have a sense of belonging to an integrated hierarchy of 
aggregations on different levels. For example, I need a sense of belonging to my 
family or immediate group, which in turn belongs with other families to my 
community; and that my community, with other communities, belongs to my 
nation; that my nation belongs to, for example, the ‘South’, or the ‘West’, and 
that to humankind; that humankind belongs to the whole created order, and that 











I stress that this is an example. There must be a hierarchy, but its constituent 
aggregations could be very different.
There are a number of consequences that derive from the hierarchy of significant 
aggregations to which an individual might belong. For one, the hierarchy of 
aggregations is the natural source of ethics. Each level promotes the under­
standing necessary for dealing appropriately, that is justly, with members of the 
aggregation below. Consider, for example, how one could treat with fairness a 
family member without an image of what the family ought to be (or how to 
determine obligations to one’s own family, over against the needs of other 
families), without an image of what a community of families should be.
The desire to belong at the level above is what keeps one in relation to others 
on the same level while distinguishing oneself from them, even competing with 
them, and is thus the natural sanction for behaviour at the level in question. 
Should one levels be missing or weak, there would be a sense of arbitrariness to 
whatever ethical directives emerge in the levels below.
Contrary to much ‘liberal’ rhetoric, a person cannot simply belong to Humanity, 
or even Christianity. One needs the ‘nest of boxes’ sense that only an integrated 
hierarchy of aggregations can provide.
In the secular world affirming paradigm, it is a consequence of belief in a trans­
cendent creator that one must recognise the desirability of understanding all 
aspects of experience in relation to their creator. This entails two inter-related 
things.
On the one side, there is a need for coherence in the understanding of the divine 
character as expressed in its attitudes to each of the levels of aggregation, that 
is, a non-schisophrenic, and therefore credible, divine personality. On the other 
side, there is a need that one’s own understanding of the rest of experience, sub 
specie aetemitatis, also be coherent.7
There can, of course, be parallel hierarchies. A second hierarchy may be a com­
plete one, with its own aggregations at every level, each of them virtually 
independent of aggregations in the first hierarchy. Alternatively, the hierarchies 
may interlace the second, forming one or more loops on the dominant hierarchy.
Religion itself can constitute such a hierarchy - all the way from local congre­
gation to world-wide church and beyond - that can either be highly independent 
or practically indistinguishable from a secular hierarchy. In a crisis situation, an
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attempt may be made to substitute the religious institution for one or more 
levels of the secular hierarchy, thinking of it as an alternative community.
Clearly, religion also has a role to play in the integration of other aggregations.
I have presented aggregations significant in identity in terms of their function 
within a secular world affirming tradition. They are just as important within a 
nature religion tradition, although no longer aspects of a secular realm in a 
dualistic reality but, rather, part of the monistic reality. In nature religion, each 
aggregation will be regarded as an aspect of the ultimately real and that, in the 
eyes of an observer from a secular world affirming tradition, might be seen as 
equivalent to having no religion at all. Alternatively, it may appear to be 
divinising family, community, and nation.8 It is because aggregations significant 
in identity are an important factor in both secular world affirming religion and 
in nature religion, and may receive the same description while differing in reality 
status, that it is essential to sub-divide the category ‘primal’ if clarity is to 
emerge. In particular, it is important to understand why it is that sometimes 
nature religion aggregations receive descriptions that seem identical with those 
in secular world affirming traditions, while at other times they appear as a 
polytheism.
The variety in which nature religion manifests exists because it is possible to 
relate to significant aggregations, and to natural aspects of the world-out-there, 
in three perspectives each appropriate to a different circumstance. I (1991:276) 
have called these perspectives: Actual Life-World Perspective, Total Perspective, 
and the Symbolised Life-World Perspective.
In the Actual Life-World Perspective, each aspect of everyday existence is per­
ceived as it exists in itself and in interaction with its neighbours. That is, without 
overt symbolic implications and without relationship to postulated entities or 
even to the totality of things, although a unity is assumed. This perspective exists 
in every culture and it suffices for a sense of belonging in an acceptable, rela­
tively unthreatened life situation. It is the circumstance in which it might be said 
that the observed have no religion. Such aggregations and features of the natural 
order are not a hierarchy, but rather a network (although the network may con­


















If the acceptability of life experience, and therefore the sense of belonging 
generated by the actual life-world perspective, is threatened, then a move will be 
made to enter the Total Perspective. In this, one stands back from all the bits 
and pieces of life and seeks to know what all-that-is-out-there feels like, and 
perhaps asking the cognitive question, ‘What is it all about?’ The Totality may 
be given a name which, inter alia, justifies the view that Africans always had a 
high god, provided one does not interpret that to necessarily mean a transcendent 















In a chronic threat to the acceptability of the life-world, there is time and 
motivation to enter the Symbolised Life-World Perspective in which significant 
aspects of the life-world are separated out and then given symbolic content and 
thus established in relationship with each other. This enables them to be reinte­
grated at a level beyond that of their actually experienced relationships. The 
different aspects may be personified, given the characters and whims of beasts, 
or conceived as vital forces that are neither personal nor impersonal. Whichever 
it is, the move must enable the adherents to hold their cosmos together, if only
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by explaining the conflicts.1^ In this situation, in which each threat to acceptability 
must be dealt with ad hoc, traditions can become enormously rich in myth, 
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Each of these perspectives has a characteristic language. They sound very 
different, but they reflect the same purpose.
This is as far as I need to take my theoretical explication for present purposes. 
But not wishing to be misunderstood as overemphasising the individual aspects 
of religion, I must say that if I were developing the theory further, it would be 
with the corporate factors of the tradition community processes.
It should now be clear why I prefer to speak of monistic ‘Withdrawal Religion’ 
and dualistic ‘Secular World Affirming Religion’, rather than of the empirically 
arrived at ‘Soteriological’ type; and why it is the bifurcation built into these two 
types which lends them their soteriological quality. Less clear, perhaps, will be 
the relation between what Pye means by ‘primal religion’ and what I mean by 
‘nature religion’, but I will return to this in the next section.
It is perhaps appropriate to say something about the choice of the terms. In my 
own writings, I have avoided ‘primal religion’ because it had been associated with 
theories of religious evolution in a way that made it no more than a polite form 
of ‘primitive’.10
For those living in Africa, where this type of religious tradition is as viable an 
option as any other, the idea of a religious evolution on the grand scale (from 
type to type - not simply greater sophistication within a type), as Weber, 
Whitehead, Scholem, and Bellah proposed it, is out of the question. There may 
be elaboration within a world-view, or change from world-view to world-view,
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but not an evolution from world-view to world-view (as though one were more 
developed than another). In fact, what some call ‘primal’, or even ‘primitive’, is 
the telos of the other types of tradition. There are many in the postmodern West 
who embrace a present reality affirming monism not far from the world-view of 
Africa. One might even discern a feminist preference for the nature religion 
paradigm.11
PRIMAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL RELIGION FROM THE OTHER END
In this last section, it is my intention to reexamine, from the standpoint of the 
theory set out above, some of those issues which raised interesting questions 
when considered from the perspective of primal and soteriological religion. We 
will see that some of them turn out to have been wrongly conceived, others 
become more sharply focused.
In some situations, living with multiple world-views is an inevitable consequence 
of change. In others it seems to be chosen. It is this which suggests that 
consideration should be given to what might be gained from such a mixing. To 
get clarity here, we need to know which of the three theoretically arrived at ideal 
types are present, and what are their compatible and incompatible elements.12 
Additionally, we need to know how the incompatibilities that do exist might be 
smoothed. In general, there are three processes serving this purpose: contain­
ment within relevant aspects of the dominant tradition, allocation to different 
aspects of the life-world, and bridging. This last process can take a number of 
forms.13
The obvious gain in mixing the types is in being able to pick the best from 
multiple worlds; in particular, of having a now and a not-yet, a present rooted­
ness and a future hope and, perhaps, an immortal soul and a resurrection. Not 
all of the non-negotiable symbols of the three types of religion are incompatible 
as between any two of them, nor are the processes (for example, the need to 
integrate significant aggregations) restricted to one type of tradition. Much can 
be held together.
There are, however, costs in picking from both worlds. These have to do, on the 
one hand, with the resulting lack of clarity in one’s logic of belonging and a 
consequent loss in one’s sense of belonging to the ultimately real. On the other 
hand, the costs have to do with the fragmenting of identity. Both the content of 
one’s self-image and commitments toward significant aspects of the 
world-out-there become confused. Not only does this pose a problem for 
individual and communal mental health, but for such consequential matters as 
development.
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Therefore, voluntary mixing of traditions is a possible move in times of security. 
It is not so possible in times of insecurity. Involuntary mixing will usually elicit 
some form of containment, allocation, or bridging.
Any discussion of the possibility of holding together religions of different types 
must take account of the Chinese propensity to do just that. I have always 
supposed this to imply a sort of hidden meta-religion or an almost unconscious 
meta-response to all-that-out-there, but the multi-religious situation can be 
experienced in at least three different ways in the same culture.
In the Chinese situation, each of the major traditions - Confucianism, Tao, 
Buddhism - might serve as the sole religion for some adherents, together with 
a culture-specific tolerance toward the other two. Some might hold two or more 
of the religions together as competing total traditions from which they pick 
desirable bits, but at the price of a weakened logic of belonging. Most, I suspect, 
have reduced each ‘religion’ to the way a hidden meta-religion deals with a 
particular aggregation or aspect of the natural world. In this last case, while the 
traditions may appear to the outsider as different religions allocated to different 
parts of life, to the insider they are what the meta-religion has to say about a 
particular aggregation.14 Such a meta-religion need be no more than a cosmic 
trust. The cosmos, for many adherents, might be virtually synonymous with 
nation or people.
When this meta-religion is of the nature religion type, and the life-world aspect 
associated with each aggregation is therefore affirmed to be, and dealt with as, 
part of the ultimately-real, it is more difficult for the outsider not to perceive 
what is going on as being competing religions allocated to different life realms.
The meta-religion could not, I think, be of the ‘withdrawal’ religion type unless 
it was already functioning with a Trikaya doctrine - which itself mixes the types. 
If it were ‘secular world affirming’, it would almost certainly have to be overt.15 
The situation would then be at once clearer but more difficult. If what a 
meta-religion of the secular world affirming type has to say for a particular 
aggregation or sub-hierarchy of aggregations becomes a primal religion, or if an 
extant primal religion existed strongly enough in relation to that aggregation or 
group of aggregations, then there would be the overt competition that Pye speaks 
of between the universalising and particularising aspects of the two types of 
tradition. The secular world affirming meta-religion would deny the 
ultimate-reality status of the aggregations, seeking instead to reduce them to 
aspects of the secular realm.
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Returning to the relation between Pye’s use of ‘primal’ and my use of ‘nature 
religion’, it could be said that primal religion is nature religion emphasising a 
particular aggregation or aggregations. It might do this while remaining cosmic 
in spirit, or it might do it precisely because a more cosmic quality of belonging 
is unobtainable and there is need to resort to a reduced reality (sectarian) 
belonging. It seems better to conceptually separate ‘type’ and ‘aggregations’, for 
the latter are not always singled out for emphasis and, if they are, they can be 
spoken about from each of the three possible ‘perspectives’ in very different 
ways.
If primal religion roots its adherents in the present reality, then it is certainly the 
present reality affirming monism that I call ‘nature religion’, but then it will 
normally begin with the family and then a geographically or otherwise limited 
community or nation. Nation may be emphasised but it will not be exclusive. 
Rather, a whole hierarchy or network of aggregations and their integration are 
important to a sense of belonging in both ‘immediate experience affirming’ types 
of religion.
That nature religion does not have to be associated with the National level only, 
as Shinto seems to be with Japan (and perhaps Merlin and London real estate 
are with Britain), is illustrated by Tutu’s use of ‘Africanness’. ‘Africanness’ is, at 
the same time, much broader and much narrower than ‘Nation’. It is at once a 
nature religion world-view at its broadest, but includes appropriate, distinctive 
elements at every other level - down to one’s own family and peers.
Because aggregations in nature religion do not operate in a secular realm, but 
are part of the ultimately real, a primal religion could not become soteriological 
under pressure to be relevant to a ‘modern’ world unless it was subject to what 
Pye calls a ‘crossover’. The sense of belonging in a present reality affirming 
tradition can expand beyond family and community to emphasise one’s obliga­
tions to humanity, but it cannot bypass family and community in the process. If, 
for example, African Traditional Religion, which has been primarily a ‘present 
reality affirming monism’, takes on ‘soteriological’ aspects in this bypassing or 
saving-out-of sense, it is involved in a ‘crossover’; it is moving into one of the 
other ideal types.
Basic to a number of these situations is the fact that, in both the primal and the 
dualistic soteriological types, there is need to deal with aspects of the life-world, 
and that while these may have the same descriptive boundaries (for example, 
family, community, nation), they are, in the primal type, part of the monistic 
ultimately-real, while in the dualistic soteriological type they are aspects of a 
secular realm. This may lead one to confuse the religious role of factors in the
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secular life-world with their primal equivalents, and then to suppose that the 
primal is present with the soteriological. I believe I was doing this above when 
speaking of Judaism and Anglicanism within the primal - soteriological 
vocabulary.
The aspects of Anglicanism and Judaism addressing national belonging would, 
in general, be better understood as expressing the ultimate-reality’s attitudes to 
the national level of aggregation - and that not on its own, but included with 
everything from family and local community to humanity. These emphases are 
not necessarily evidence of primal religion.16
This, however, raises a key question: When does the emphasis on nation, class, 
family, et al, in a dualistic soteriological tradition, pass over from being simply 
a relation of the self and of the ullimately-real to aspects of the real, and 
become, instead, a separate and competing primal religion?
A primal religion, if it remains nature religion, has to embrace each level, 
severally and collectively, up to the broadest significant one, but that might not 
be wider than nation. If it emphasised salvation in and of the nation only, then 
it would have become a soteriological tradition of a reduced reality (sectarian) 
kind (Cumpsty 1991:130, 329).
Even Shinto, which seems so national, must be a standing back from 
all-that-out-there to include it all. This is probably what it does feel like for those 
who do not look significantly beyond Japan. It would be interesting, however, as 
Pye suggests, to discover if its elite representatives did not feel that they could 
translate, say, African traditional religion into Shinto thought, and thus for Shinto 
to lose, for that elite, some of its national or geographical limitation and become 
the local representative of a more universal nature religion.
It is not, of course, the case that, where the secular world affirming traditions 
have dominated, they have always been in pure form. On the contrary, where 
there is a secular world affirming thread running through the tradition commu­
nity’s history, there tend to be swings between tradition types (which I have 
referred to as a ‘dance’). It is important to understand this because if a secular 
world affirming tradition remains pure (orthodox), then it is recognised that 
transcendence requires the affirmation, not only of that which transcends, but 
also of that which is transcended (or, the work of the Creator as well as that of 
the Saviour). In that situation, one cannot contrast primal religion with the 
secular world affirming type of soteriological religion. At least one cannot 
contrast them, as I did, simply as ‘rooting’ and ‘lifting out’, because the latter has 
its own rooting mechanism. In an oversimplified way, it might be said that a
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secular world affirming tradition is the adding together of a primal and a 
soteriological tradition. It is this that we saw in Judaism and Anglicanism. 
Nevertheless, the orthodox rooting is in relation to the work of the ultimately 
real, not in the ultimately real itself. If that distinction is lost, then primal 
religion is present alongside the soteriological, and consequential symbols are in 
potential conflict.
As a last word on.aggregations in primal and secular world affirming soterio­
logical traditions, it must be said that when both types are present, the similarity 
in description (but not in reality status) given to the various aspects of the 
life-world can, and does, function as a bridge between the two world-views.17
It has not been my purpose to deal with all the complexities in the relations of 
primal and soteriological traditions to which Michael Pye drew our attention - 
or even those that I suggested myself. Rather I have sought to emphasise, on the 
one hand, what might be important pastorally in an Africa struggling between 
two ‘types’ and to illustrate, on the other hand, the added analytical power 
achieved by moving one step beyond ‘types o f to theoretical ‘types’. I do think 
that my theoretical position offers greater analytical and explanatory power in 
understanding the situations which Pye introduced. But I want to reiterate that 
such an illustrative meeting could not have taken place unless a hands-on 
researcher were prepared to begin the ascent (or is it descent?) from data to 
theory. I hope that my contribution to the universal language of our discipline 
might be as useful to him as his contribution of both data and language has been 
to me. Certainly the rooting quality of primal religion had not registered with me 
until Pye contrasted it with the very evident soteriological quality of the tradition 
types which have a divide built in. Once the contrast is made, one sees it 
everywhere and a whole new set of questions arises. That, of course, is the 




Unless otherwise qualified, page references are to the previous chapter. 
Shinto adopted much from Buddhism according to Peter Takajama
(1988).
Consider in this regard the following extract from a hymn written by 
A C Alington for the Shrewsbury School Hymn Book.
Lord God of Hosts, through whom alone 
A Prince can rule his nation,
Who settest up Kings upon their throne 
And orderest each man’s station;
Now, and through ages following,
This grace to us be given:
To serve and love an earthly King
Who serves our King in Heaven.
Koheleth manifests this sense of loss in there being nothing new under 
the sun, grand as the cycles may be.
In the postmodern West there are many movements which represent a 
return to affirmation of a present monistic reality, that is, to an 
emphasis on interpersonal relations, the natural order and the 
immediate texture of life. Some of these movements have an overt 
interest in primal religion, in others it is covert.
I (1994) have elsewhere suggested that these paradigms for reality are 
so radically a part of experience, that they condition even how one sees 
one’s own face in a mirror.
For an account of what can happen when there are strong aggregations 
with a conceptual gap, or where there are weak or ill-defined levels of 
aggregations, or where there is the problem of the conflict between 
different levels of aggregation, see Cumpsty 1991:324.
The importance of these aggregations in the identities of those sharing 
in a traditional African world-view can hardly be over emphasised. 
When migrant workers leave their rural homes for the mines and leave 
behind all their lower level aggregations, suddenly membership of a 
national aggregation, which had not figured strongly when everyone 
around shared it, becomes all important. This is a recipe for violence. 
The easiest way to confirm one’s membership of that one remaining 
aggregation, and to demonstrate that aggregation as the best, is to take 
up cudgels against those of a different nationality group. The need to 
establish ‘Africanness’, or other higher level aggregations, as well as 
reestablish some lower level ones, becomes very pressing. Generally, 
there needs to be balance between aggregations, but in new nations, and
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ones suffering the imposition of another culture, there may be need for 
emphasis on the national level to pull together smaller entities and to 
make sense of, and give content to, the national level of belonging. 
Consider, for example, the category ‘children born to die’ in Yoruba 
religion’s dealing with smallpox and infant mortality.
Perhaps for our discipline Michael Pye has rescued ‘primal’ by giving it 
a more positive connotation in the contrast with ‘soteriological’. I 
suspect, however, that most contemporary westerners would understand 
‘soteriological’ to refer to serious or real religion, and ‘primal’ to refer 
to something which has not reached that status. In that situation, one 
might feel enabled to hang onto both traditions simply because they do 
not have the same status - a variety of ‘great tradition, little tradition’. 
I once suggested using ‘primary’ religion (for such it is), but in the end 
preferred the title ‘nature religion’ because it reflects the fact that it is 
a world-view in which reality begins with the natural order.
In the academic discussion of religion, Africa was included among 
religions labelled ‘primitive’ and then ‘primal’. It was the limited 
understanding of primal religion which enabled people to conceptualise 
world religion in evolutionary perspective.
The elements of the three ideal types are discussed in Cumpsty 1991 
ch 8, a table of non-negotiable elements is to be found on page 218. 
For ways in which a community may seek to hold together elements of 
two world-views see ‘Complex Tradition Communities’ in Cumpsty 
1991:417.
This position is the ‘Symbolised Life-World Perspective’, described 
above, where the unity of the cosmos is not constantly threatened.
A covert felt sense of reality is inevitably a cosmic trust and that, 
inevitably monistic in one form or the other. If there were no trust, or 
reality was felt to be dualistic, that would surely drive the adherent to 
some conceptualisation and hence out of the covert position.
It is interesting that the entity ‘local community’ is less frequently 
included in religious consciousness unless it is also a minority group, 
ethnic, or religious.
It is my view that these are the most important bridges between the two 
immediate experience affirming world-views - not least in the case of 
gender preferences for the different world-views, where men and 
women meet in shared perception of the descriptive boundaries of an 
aggregation while assigning it different reality status.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cumpsty, J S 1991. Religion as belonging: a general theory o f religion. Lanham 
MD: University Press of America.
Cumpsty, J S 1994. ‘Religion and consciousness: a pointer to qualitative method 
in the social sciences.’ In Science and vision. Edited by Duvenhage, P 
and Meulenberg-Buskens, I. Pretoria: HSRC.
Pye, M 1989. ‘Shinto and the typology of religion’. Method and theory in the 
study of religion 1:2.
Pye, M 1994. Keynote address to the inaugural meeting of the South African 
Academy of Religion.
Takayama, K P 1988. ‘The revitalization movement of modern Japanese civil 
religion.’ Sociological Analysis 48:4.
Tutu, D 1973. ‘Some African insights and the Old Testament.’ In Relevant 
theology for Africa. Mapumulo: Missiological Institute.
39
